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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an examination of the concept of
discipline in the Soviet armed forces. The Soviets view
discipline as a requirement for attaining order and
control. Soviet authorities argue that strict military
discipline is the most vital condition contributing to high
combat capability and constant combat readiness. [Ref. 1:
p. 289]
Soviet military discipline is a combination of several
permutations. Whether considered as battlefield discipline/
barracks discipline or discipline imposed through punish-
ment/ the different components of discipline merge to form
an overall concept of military discipline that is examined
in this study. (The concepts of labor discipline and party
discipline are not examined in this study. Only military
discipline will be examined as it directly influences combat
capability.) Yet discipline is not reflected in
quantitative measures of military power such as orders of
battle and tables of organization and equipment commonly
used to assess military power/ as during Congressional
budget hearings. Therefore it is important to discuss
discipline which is an often overlooked item when estimating
military capabilities.
There is an apparent paradox that exists in the Soviet
method of attaining this disciplined force. Soviet writers,
like the late Marshal Grechko/ recognize that discipline may
be achieved by methods of punishment/ or with a system of
awards and incentives/ and by enhanced patriotic zeal to
boost morale and thereby instill a will to fight [Ref. 2:
pp. 169-173]. Yet the historical record seems to indicate a
cultural reliance on methods of physical punishment to
impose discipline.
This thesis will briefly examine the concept and
application of discipline in the Soviet armed forces through
its historical progression. Historical analysis helps to
identify peculiar Russian characteristics that exist today ;
such as the reliance on physical punishments to impose
discipline. Further/ each culture provides its own forms
and contents/ hence the development of military discipline
in the Soviet Union is different from the West. Discipline
concepts/ practices and habits therefore become historical
and cultural trends unique to the development of Russian and
Soviet military forces.
The reliance on punishment as a method of achieving
discipline and control appears to manifest itself repeatedly
in Russian and Soviet history to incorporate new weapons and
strategies. For example/ Peter the Great had to impose
previously absent standards of discipline on his forces to
assimilate linear tactics and muskets. Nicholas I imposed
strict discipline and control to secure his throne. Lenin
and Stalin both demanded discipline in the armed forces to
safeguard the regime and to effectively use the implements
of modern war like the tank and the airplane [Ref. 3:
pp. 220-222]. Marshal Sokolovsky stated that strict
discipline is a necessary requirement for warfare in the
nuclear missle age [Ref. 4: p. 378]. Yet in each instance/
punishment seems to be the primary method of attaining the
requisite discipline.
There is a second apparent paradox that arises in
examining the concept of discipline in the Soviet armed
forces. Discipline as a factor of modern war was
identified by the eminent military theorist Carl von
Clausewitz as a "principle morale element." Clausewitz
significantly influenced Lenin and subsequent Soviet writers
through his fundamental exposition on the conduct of war
[Ref. 5: pp. 322-323]. In his classical treatise On War /
Clausewitz wrote of the morale elements/ including disci-
pline/ and stressed that while the morale elements are of
supreme significance/ they are all non-quantifiable [Ref. 6:
pp. 182-192].
The apparent paradox arises since the Soviets have
adopted a particular political philosophy/ Marxism-Leninism/
that emphasizes the us - )f sc "mtific analysis for the
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solution of human as well as engineering problems. The
scientific method/ though, requires the quantification of
discipline in order to develop a solution. The effect of
this philosophy is examined in this study through its
dialectic reasoning process and its requirements for a
scientific solution for the Soviet discipline problem in
contrast with Clausewitz's dictum. The apparent results of
the application of this philosophy to the problems of
contemporary war and military discipline has been the
development of the concept of the "new Soviet man" and the
reliance on the science of cybernetics. These results will
be discussed for their impact on the Soviet military
discipline problem.
This study includes a discussion of current disciplinary
infractions in the Soviet armed forces to illustrate the
apparent paradox raised by the requirement for quantifi-
cation. Problems associated with disciplinary infractions
such as alcoholism/ ethnic unrest and overcrowding do not
seem readily convertible to numerical equivalents for
inclusion in mathematical expressions.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF
DISCIPLINE
The Soviets claim that their state is the result of the
evolutionary process of historical progression. Therefore
it is reasonable to examine the concept of military
discipline as an element of that progression. It is useful
to study the development and application of discipline
through Russian history because each culture has its own
forms and contents. Hence, the Russian and Soviet concept
of military discipline has evolved and developed in a
different manner than in the West.
Historical analysis provides a foundation for
understanding because events do not occur in isolation, but
are part of a context. Therefore, it is useful to begin
this study before the establishment of the modern Soviet
state or the Bolshevik Revolution. Modern Soviet leaders
like Grechko and Gorshkov proudly refer to specific events
of pre-Revolutionary Russia to provide legitimacy and
heritage for the current regime. Events such as Peter's
victory at Poltava, the defeat of Napoleon, and the naval
success in the Battle of Sinop are used in an effort to
promote good order and discipline.
However, a review of the historical record reveals a
seemingly consistent pattern for Russian and Soviet leaders
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to rely on what by Western democratic standards are brutal/
physical punishments to achieve a disciplined, controllable
force. A paradox arises when this pattern of brutal,
physical punishments is contrasted first with Peter's
development of a system of military regulations ostensibly
promulgated to protect the individual soldier and sailor
from abuses. [Ref. 7: pp. 384-387]
The modern concept of military discipline in the Soviet
Union can properly be said to begin with the reign of Peter
I (the Great). It was during his reign that Russia came to
be recognized as a great power in the world, and to
accomplish that feat Peter had to impose standards of
military discipline that were previously not present.
Discipline in the reign of Peter I (1698-1725) was
imposed on the military by imperial diktat. Strict
discipline was required in order to incorporate the advances
in the art of war, like linear formations and musketry, to
successfully compete against other European powers. Yet the
requisite discipline was imposed with physical punishments.
Discipline at times seems to be a goal unto itself. This
is evidenced by the development and use of the knout, a
Russian refinement of the ca t-o-nine-tails for whippings and
beatings that often resulted in death for actual and
perceived offenses. Yet at the time it was believed that
only through harsh, iron-bound discipline and rigid physical
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and mental controls could the serfs be molded into an
effective fighting force. [Ref. 8: pp. 211-212].
Discipline continued to be imposed by physical
punishments when the Preobrazhensky Guards were empowered
to combat two persistent evils—alcoholism and slovenliness.
Yet these scourges were punished with the knout and the
lash rather than by some method of education and incentives
[Ref. 9: p. 51]. Furthermore, a sailor could be suspended
by a net beneath the bowspirit for si >king below decks or
for failing to salute an officer. A soldier could face
permanent exile in Siberia, plus a flogging, for losing his
flint. The exact form of punishment was in large measure
left to the capricious whim of the officer at the scene
[Ref. 10: pp. 22-24]. It appears that the common belief
was, as Lincoln puts it, that the Russian serf "could learn
only by the stick," and military discipline was so imposed
[Ref. 11: p. 179].
That Peter succeeded in using punishment to impose
discipline on his forces is evidenced by the victory won at
Poltava. Charles XII of Sweden had described the Russian
Army as "an undisciplined militia" after he routed the
Russian forces at the Battle of Narva on 20 November 1700
[Ref. 12: p. 47]. Charles so described the Russians
because they could not effectively engage in modern combat.
Yet less than nine years later, after discipline was imposed
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with physical punishments/ Peter's forces decisively
defeated the Swedes at Poltava on 28 June 1709, using the
implements and tactics of modern war.
Perhaps the tendency to rely on physical punishment to
impose and enforce discipline is a function of Peter's
successes in combat. In any case, the punishments stand in
contrast to Peter's policies mentioned earlier. However,
the paradox of using physical punishments for disciplinary
purposes increases when the methods of Alexander Suvorov are
considered
.
Alexander Suvorov (1730-1800) stands apart in Russian
history as an unusual combat commander. Recognizing the
necessity of discipline for success in combat, Suvorov
relentlessly studied the conduct of warfare to learn its
lessons. His essential elements for success were
assessment, speed and attack. In his view, though, these
were the means to an end, the heart of the system being the
individual Russian soldier. Suvorov believed that Christian
training would not only exalt the soldier, but that it
would also reduce his evil tendencies towards alcoholism,
slovenliness and disrespect. [Ref. 11: pp. 253-255]
Suvorov claimed that discipline was the mother of
victory. The mandated method of teaching discipline in
Suvorov's armies allotted significant time to the study of
rules, regulations and instructions so that they might be
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fully understood by the common soldier. Suvorov insisted
that officers take steps against soliders who committed
infractions by supervision/ counsel and exhortation.
Furthermore, Suvorov directed that punishments be reserved
for the gross offenders. [Ref. 10: pp. 25-30]
Suvorov succeeded in creating a sense of national
military pride and a high degree of discipline in the troops
under his command. He won resounding victories for
Catherine in battles against the Turks, Poles, and Swedes.
His most dramatic victories came in the service of Tsar
Paul I during the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1800) of
Russia, Britain and Austria against Napoleonic France.
During 1798, Suvorov led his army into Italy and within a
year eliminated Napoleon's previous gains. Nearly always
outnumbered, the Russians showed surprising mobility and
tactical expertise. The ability to perform such feats is
evidence of a highly disciplined force, and that discipline
was achieved without the reliance on physical punishments.
Due to the failure of Coalition armies in the Netherlands in
1799, Suvorov was forced to fight his way across Switzerland
and across southern Germany, but maintained his army as a
cohesive fighting unit, a feat that can only be accomplished
with a disciplined force. In 1800, Paul, disgusted with the
performance of his British and Austrian allies, removed
Russia from the coalition and recalled Suvorov. Suvorov
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died soon after returning to Russia. His disciplinary
methods passed away with him.
Despite the success and discipline achieved by Suvorov,
there is a marked return to Petrine habits of physical
punishment to impose discipline in the armed forces. The
rapid return to brutal/ physical punishments is exemplified
by the methods of Nicholas I to secure his throne. Nicholas
sought to impose strict discipline and control over the
armed forces in the aftermath of the stillborn Decembrist
Revolt of December 1825.
Many of the participants of the Decembrist Revolt had
served as occupation officers in France following the
Napoleonic Wars. Most of them were acquainted with ideas of
Western liberalism such as liberty, equality/ and
fraternity/ and sought to have them accepted in Russia.
Nicholas/ rather than incorporating these concepts into his
military administration/ relied on previously proven methods
of physical punishment to impose discipline. This began
with the brutal torture and execution of the primary
conspirators/ of which Nicholas is said to have participated
to learn the extent of the revolutionary ferment. [Ref. 9:
p. 123].
Nicholas was apparently not satisfied with only
executing the major conspirators. The imposition of
discipline throughout the entire armed forces proceeded with
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tortures/ executions/ imprisonments/ and Siberian exile.
Nicholas created a secret police organization in 1826/ the
Third Section/ that was empowered to monitor discipline and
impose punishments. The primary methods of the Third
Section can be identified as early attempts at organized
terror due to the severity and arbitrariness of their
punishments. Hence/ discipline came to be imposed with
exiles being sent to Siberia with only the clothes on their
backs while other people suffered the tortures of the rack
in Tsarist dungeons. [Ref. 13: pp. 8-10]
The paradox of using physical punishments to impose
discipline becomes more pronounced with the success of the
Bolshevik revolution. The Bolsheviks came to power with
such slogans as "Peace/ Bread and Land/" and seemed to
espouse democratic ideals of humanitarian socialism
[Ref. 14: pp. 292-294]. Yet the Bolsheviks were to impose
discipline by the intensified use of physical punishments.
Such measures included the outright shooting of thousands of
tsarist officers for perceived breeches of discipline. In
other disciplinary cases/ suspect persons were exiled to
Siberia or sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment/ not
only for direct failures of discipline/ but also for
suspected disloyalty and disaffection with the regime
[Ref. 15: pp. 532-535].
Possibly the most vivid example of the brutal imposition
of discipline by the new Soviet regime is found when
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examining the conduct of the new secret police, the Cheka.
The Cheka was given authority to use any means it deemed
necessary to impose order and discipline. The result was
the use of organized mass terror to impose discipline.
Chekists began penetrating the armed forces and suspect
persons were summarily tortured, sent to special camps, or
executed for disaffection and lapses in discipline.
Literally thousands, if not millions, suffered and perished
in this fashion. [Ref. 16: pp. 165-168]
The reliance on physical punishments and mass terror to
impose discipline would dramatically reappear in 1937-38
when Stalin directed that the purges be instituted against
the military. The purges, though they can be said to have
served a purpose in imposing discipline and control, stand
in stark contrast to the liberal clauses and guarantees of
human rights contained in the 1936 constitution [Ref. 3:
p. 381]. In essence, Stalin sought to eliminate the
military as a potential instrument of political change.
Further, Stalin sought to impose his concept of communist
military discipline on the armed forces. The execution of
thousands of officers, and the imprisonment of thousands
more, removed the last of the imperial officers from the
military. Yet Medvedev notes a unique difference involved
in Stalin's discipline methods. Not only were the officers
the victims, but their families were equally punished for
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"crimes against the state." The consequence of such brutal
actions* whereby millions of people were arbitrarily
accused/ tortured/ imprisoned and shot/ was a terror induced
discipline [Ref. 17: pp. 210-215]
An interesting example of the Soviet use of physical
punishments for disciplinary purposes during the Second
World War is the unique Soviet application of the penal
battalion. Penal units had existed in imperial times / and
prior to the war they had been used for military
construction. Though normally working in harsh climates
with antiquated implements/ terms of service for malcontents
were commonly only a few months. During the Second World
War, however, soldiers who were considered as disciplinary
problems not serious enough to be shot were sentenced to
penal units for tens of years. It is highly doubtful that
anyone served their full term. These units/ instead of
being used for rear area construction/ became minefield
clearers with their bodies. Others were unarmed spotters
riding on the outside of tanks. Some were organized into
infiltration parties to penetrate German lines and call down
artillery fire. Though most were promised amnesty if their
task was successfully accomplished/ it is difficult to
believe that it was ever granted. Furthermore/ refusal to
follow orders in a penal unit brought instant execution to
the soldier and reprisals against his family. [Ref. 18:
pp. 213-220]
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Post-war discipline was maintained with a familiar
tsarist technique of internal exile. This is consistent
with the historical record of physical punishment to
maintain discipline. Stalin/ possibly fearful of a modern
Decembrist coup/ sent military personnel who had had contact
with foreigners during the war to Siberian labor camps to
purge their minds of bourgeois contamination. Thus/
repatriated prisoners of war, men whose units had linked up
with Allied units in Central Europe, and people who were
involved with lend-lease transfers suddenly found themselves
as prisoners of the government they had just fought for as a
preventative disciplinary measure. Also in this group were
victims of the purges who had been rehabilitated during the
war. They too found themselves, quite often with their
families, returned to the frozen wastes of Siberia and
Kolyma. [Ref. 17: pp. 460-469]
The predeliction for punishment continues to the present
day despite published regulations that characterize corporal
and harsh punishments as bourgeois. The regulations state
that punishment is to be avoided to the utmost, that
discipline is to be attained by education and exhortation
[Ref. 19]. Yet this contrasts with the methods of disci-
pline imposed on Petro Grigorenko.
Grigorenko was disciplined with what can be termed the
perverted use of modern medical techniques. Grigorenko was
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then a major general in the Soviet Army and a decorated
combat commander from the Second World War. Diagnosed as
insane in 1964 due to recurrent manifestations of anti-
Soviet behavior when he insisted that legal guarantees and
constitutional rights be enforced/ Grigorenko was
incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals. He was subjected to
drug treatments and physical abuses that rival any Petrine
torture chamber. [Ref. 20]
Hence/ the historical record seems to reveal a
consistent reliance on methods of physical punishment to
impose discipline. The record presents a paradox because of
the clear example of the success of Suvorov in attaining a
disciplined/ controllable force with what might be termed
enlightened methods instead of punishment to impose
discipline. The paradox becomes more pronounced/ however/
when the examples of punishment are contrasted with imperial
reforms/ constitutional clauses and published regulations
that denigrate the value of punishment as a discipline
method. The paradox is not resolvable, but appears to be a
historically ingrained condition of the Soviet state and the
concept of discipline.
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Ill . DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
The factors discussed below are the ones most frequently
reported by a wide variety of books, emigre reports, and the
Soviet press, as being factors in disciplinary problems.
The discussion is, quite naturally, not all inclusive, but
demonstrates items not normally included in military
estimates. But to gain an understanding of the concept of
discipline in the Soviet armed forces it is necesary to
examine some of the factors that appear to be involved in
disciplinary infractions.
Furthermore, the identification of factors that seem to
result in disciplinary infractions helps to illuminate the
apparent paradox created by the Soviet requirement for
scientific solutions and quantification. Problems such as
alcoholism, ethnic unrest and overcrowding, and their
combined effects, do not seem readily convertible into
numeric equivalents of any merit.
A. ALCOHOL
Alcoholism is a recognized social malady of the Soviet
Union and the armed forces are not exempt from the disease.
As evidence of the widespread use of alcohol, Kerblay
reports that alcohol consumption in the Soviet Union has
quadrupled in the last quarter century and accounts for one
21
third of all consumer food purchases [Ref. 21: p. 290].
Furthermore, Viktor Suvorov identifies alcohol abuse as the
primary cause of disciplinary infractions in the Soviet
armed forces, resulting not only in drunkenness, but also in
theft, bribery, record falsification, and deliberate
equipment damage. Alcohol is used not only to deaden the
senses and allow a period of escape from the hardships and
pressures of daily life, it is also used to celebrate and
commemorate every event [Ref. 22: pp. 262-263].
The debilitating effects of alcohol on physical and
mental capacities are nearly universally acknowledged, as
are the consequent reductions in efficiency and economy, and
a breakdown in military discipline. However, the
consumption of alcohol reportedly continues to increase, and
Soviet personnel demonstrate ingenious techniques for
acquiring their craved alcohol.
Soviet soldiers and sailors are supposedly only
permitted to drink when expressly allowed in accordance with
regulations. In actuality, according to Suvorov, the Soviet
soldier drinks when the opportunity to drink presents itself
in direct violation of disciplinary restrictions. This
includes resorting to drinking eau de cologne or eating shoe
polish when vodka is unavailable. [Ref. 23: p. 39]
Emigre reports indicate that many servicemen rely on
parcels sent from home to supply their alcohol requirements.
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In order to guarantee delivery/ postal clerks are often
bribed to allow specific packages to pass inspection
unopened. To supplement their paltry incomes, servicemen
often sell government equipment on the black market which is
a deliberate disciplinary infraction. Rubles thus earned
can be used either for bribes or for the open purchase of
vodka. [Ref. 23: pp. 38-40]
Soviet military personnel frequently find it difficult
to smuggle alcohol into their garrisons and posts. This is
particularly true in the navy where seamen are inspected and
searched as they proceed on and off their ships. However/
alcohol is available onboard for cleaning electronic
equipment. The alcohol/ by several accounts/ is never used
for its intended purpose. It is consumed by whom ever can
get it and the equipment is cleaned with gasoline [Ref. 24:
p. 29]. The gasoline leaves a nice shiny glean, but
corrodes the metal and ruins the equipment. Alcohol
intended for cleaning purposes is also apparently stolen by
troops in the other service branches of the Soviet armed
forces/ with gasoline or other fluids substituted as a
cleaner. The result is a clear breech of discipline as well
as a degradation of equipment and people.
The drive for alcohol also leads to falsification of
records to account for the missing fluids. Viktor Belenko
identified alcohol as a vital component of the MiG-25. Used
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as a de-icer/ a coolant for electronics, and as a fuel
additive/ alcohol was necessary in large quantities. The
alcohol went into people/ not airplanes/ and pilots
falsified altitude reports and others dumped fuel to account
for the use. [Ref. 25: pp. 92-93]
Therefore/ alcoholism is a cause and effect of
discipline problems. Furthermore/ the consequences of such
chronic alcoholism are not only equipment degradations but
often fatalities. People who drink to escape the brutality
of their circumstances, even if only momentarily/ are in
violation of disciplinary regulations. Through this
consumption, inhibitions are lowered and other infractions
such as absenteeism/ theft and insubordination occur.
Alcohol and its widespread effects are serious detriments to
the maintenance of discipline in the Soviet armed forces.
B. FOOD
Interviews with former soldiers and sailors conducted by
Dr. Robert Bathurst reveal that the low quality of food and
the quest for more food is a source of a variety of disci-
pline problems/ such as graft/ theft and insubordination.
Food/ of course/ is a necessary requirement for daily life.
It might be expected that Soviet servicemen, serving a
regime that attaches great importance to military power,
would eat very well. Such is apparently not the case for
the majority of the soldiers and sailors.
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Typical daily fare/ as related by Suvorov and others/
consists of a breakfast limited to 150 grams of bread, 10
grams of sugar, a mug of tea and a bowl of kasha (a cereal
grain mush). Lunch, served after a morning of rigorous
physical training, usually provides the only meat for the
day. Heavily salted cod or herring, or sometimes pork
fatback, is added to a thin cabbage or potato soup that is
the mainstay of the meal. Bread, usually without butter,
makes up the balance of the meal. Supper, served late in
the day, resembles breakfast with more kasha, more bread,
another mug of tea and some sugar. Sometimes a thin soup of
potatoes and cabbages is available. [Ref. 22: pp. 226-228]
This menu is repeated day after day. Though it provides
adequate calories, the diet is noticeably lacking in
essential vitamins and minerals. The absence of fresh
fruits and vegetables, along with the lack of animal
proteins and dairy products, results in debilitating
diseases and infections that reduce combat effectiveness.
Open sores and skin ulcers, eye infections, night blindness
and tooth decay also lower morale and decrease unit
discipline
.
Suvorov does stipulate that not everyone in the Soviet
military is subjected to this dietary abuse. Pilots, crews
of nuclear submarines, members of the Strategic Rocket
Forces and Spesnatz troops receive extra meals and ration
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supplements. A variety of fresh fruits and vegetables/
along with eggs and meats/ are provided for these personnel
because the regime has determined that they are the most
important. [Ref. 26: pp. 166-168]
Interviews with former military personnel also report
that the food problem/ and consequently the discipline
problem/ is worsened by graft and corruption on the part of
kitchen personnel and senior non-commissioned officers.
The fact that food is stolen/ or used for bribes and favors/
is widely recognized and accepted [Ref. 27: p. 10]. Both
the quantity and the quality of food provided therefore
suffers
.
Cockburn reports that the average serviceman does not
have the where-wi th-all to supplement his diet by outside
purchases. A meager salary of five rubles cannot buy many
candies or cookies, or vegetables/ fruits and cheeses, when
most monies go toward the purchase of vodka and tobacco. If
the general diet is to be supplemented/ the Soviet soldier
or sailor must rely on food parcels sent from home or resort
to theft.
Discipline problems resulting from the monotonous/ sub-
standard diet includes not only the graft and theft but also
direct insubordination. Refusal to eat is a direct
violation of regulations. Incidences are kept to a minimum
by brief improvements in quantity and quality to limit the
26
dissention and prevent wide-spread revolts. The potential
for violent upheaval due to the food situation is a grave
concern for Soviet commanders. However, it must be
remembered that the vast majority of the Soviet populace
subsists on much the same diet with only minor complaints.
The possibility of more serious discipline problems
increases as awareness grows of better food availability in
Warsaw Pact armies, and among their own elites. [Ref. 28]
C. ETHNIC PROBLEMS
Suvorov and other emigres report that conflict between
ethnic groups reduces unit discipline and cohesion. Among
other things, it results in fighting, disrespect and
assaults. The Soviet Union is in actuality an empire
consisting of over one hundred nationalities. Each
nationality possesses its own unique cultural heritage and
often a distinct language. The predominant nationality is
Russian, but the rapidly increasing ethnic groups of Central
Asia present a challenge to Slavic superiority.
The tsarist legacy of intense Russif ica tion , continued
under the communist regime, has caused considerable
resentment among the minority peoples that leads to serious
discipline problems. Though the armed forces are considered
to be an instrument of integration, there are many who
claim it is a tool for continued Russian domination [Ref.
29: p. 162].
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Ample evidence of this domination is found in the
preponderance of Russians in the officer ranks. Virtually
the entire officer corps is of Slavic nationality. Further,
there is the practice of not allowing conscripts to serve in
their homeland to remove them from cultural and familial
influences. Certain minorities are deemed capable of only
serving in certain military fields. The more technical and
prestigious branches, like the Navy and the Strategic Rocket
Forces, are almost entirely staffed by Slavs. Labor
intensive branches, like the infantry and the construction
units, are assigned the Tatars, Kazakhs, and Yakuts solely
by nationality. [Ref. 22: pp. 215-217]
Interview reports prepared by Bathurst and Burger
indicate that there is a great deal of friction, and a
consequent breakdown in discipline and unit cohesion,
resulting from blatant Russian racism and a reactionary
minority backlash. Viktor Belenko reported that in some
areas, Russian officers cannot safely walk the streets after
dark out of fear for their lives [Ref. 25: p. 70]. In some
units, minority members are deliberately tormented and
suffer physical abuses, sometimes resulting in death, due to
their ethnic heritage [Ref. 30: p. 240],
Ethnic problems are a further hindrance to good order
and discipline that arises from the inferior education
provided most minorities. Discipline problems that arise
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due to incomprehension and a lack of fluency in Russian
results in accidental disobedience. A conscript who does
not understand Russian may not deliberately set out to
disobey an order, but becomes insubordinate when he fails to
act properly. Inadvertent equipment destruction often
results when a Central Asian soldier cannot operate or
repair items in accordance with instructions printed in
Russian that he cannot read [Ref. 29: pp. 181-182].
Quite obviously there is a growing potential for
increased discipline problems in the near future for the
Soviet armed forces. As more and more minority members are
conscripted to man the Soviet armies, and as the minorities
come to outnumber the Slavs, there is the possibility of the
minorities extracting their revenge for centuries of racial
oppression. Also, as the Central Asians become more aware
of the disparities that exist between themselves and the
Slavs in terms of benefits and living conditions, there may
be a demand for a more equitable distribution of the fruits
of the Soviet state. In any event, the current ethnic
conflict manifests itself in discipline problems ranging
from fights to absenteeism. The end result is a less
effective fighting force through both personnel and
equipment problems.
D. TRAINING METHODS
Physical and mental strains imposed by training methods
is reported by many emigres to decrease discipline and lower
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morale by its monotony and depersonalization. Discipline
lapses manifests themselves as disrespect and disaffection.
Training for combat is a necessary requirement for armed
forces the world over. Training in the Soviet Union is a
unique amalgamation of preparation and control. Extensive
training is conducted not only to practice the arts of war,
but by scheduling virtually every hour with some activity
the Soviets severely limit the amount of free time available
to the individual soldier. The limiting of free time is
identified by Suvorov as a deliberate attempt to impose good
order and discipline.
A peculiar aspect of the training cycle is due to the
system of conscription. Conscripts are to serve for two
years / with the exception of the navy where men must serve
three. Call-ups occur twice annually/ in spring and autumn/
so that there is an effective turnover of one quarter of the
force every six months. According to Suvorov, after an
initial training period of physical conditioning titled the
Young Soldiers Course/ the average conscript will undergo
the exact same training procedures four times before he is
demobilized. [Ref. 22: pp. 230-231]
This training is not mentally tasking. It is dull/
laborious/ and repetitive. It frequently consists of doing
the same manual task over and over again, such as loading
artillery shells or turning a steam valve. Furthermore/
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operations that in the West are accomplished by automatic
monitoring systems are performed in the Soviet Union by
humans. Men reportedly often sit and watch a multitude of
gauges or listen to a hydrophone array uninterrupted for
hours on end. Such work is boring and monotonous and is
depersonalizing in its repetition. Discipline and morale
consequently suffer. [Ref. 22: p. 235]
Several emigres relate that what little free time there
is theoretically available to the soldier or sailor is
frequently devoted to preparing for the next day. Menial
tasks such as shining shoes and belt buckles are accom-
plished then in an attempt to maintain good order and
discipline. Punishments for minor offenses apparently often
involve extra duties/ which can only be fulfilled at night
at the expense of sleep. The result of the regimen,
combined with the diet already discussed, produces tired and
fatigued soliders. [Ref. 27: p. 8]
It might then be imagined that by so regimenting the
daily life of the ordinary soldier and sailor there would be
little opportunity for mischief and misconduct. However,
the physical and mental strains imposed on the personnel are
reportedly responsible for lower morale and the consequent
lowering of motivation and discipline. Soldiers and sailors
apparently learn quickly to conserve themselves and only do
the minimum to fulfill their service obligations. An
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example of such adaptation is a perversion of the concept of
barracks discipline. It is in actual fact hazing, but it is
a disruption and distortion of what discipline is supposed
to be
.
According to many former servicemen, the soldiers and
sailors are generally divided into two groups: the "young
ones" (Molodye) and the "old men" (Stariki) [Ref. 27: p. 4].
The former are the new conscripts and the latter are those
in subsequent semesters of >ervice. This caste system is
present in berthing compartments and barracks where often
several hundred men are billeted. The elder conscripts
flaunt their superiority over the younger men, claiming
special privileges and forcing undesirable duties onto the
new men. There is a consequent breakdown in discipline as
the new men realize that their officers will not interfere
with the situation. [Ref. 22: p. 223]
Suvorov states that the majority of the heavy work and
manual labor is performed by the new man. Everything from
digging tank traps to cleaning latrines is fostered off on
the new recruits. The Molodye shine the shoes, make the
beds and clean the weapons of the Stariki , they are also
sometimes forced to hand over their meat and sugar rations
to their elders. The soldiers who are soon to be de-
mobilized appropriate the Molodye's new uniforms, exchanging
them for their worn out ones. [Ref. 22: pp. 222-223]
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The system does not appear to meet with a great deal of
resistance. Part of the reason lies in numbers/ as the new
recruits are physically outnumbered. Also, there is the
awareness that every Molodye will eventually become a
Stariki, and can then extract his privileges. It is
apparent that officers and senior enlisteds are aware of
what is happening, but tolerate the hazing as a convenient
element of control and discipline maintenance. Dissention
in the ranks between Stariki and Molodye is apparently
permitted to prevent a coalescing of dissent against the
entire regime. Yet Suvorov contends that by countenancing
and overlooking such abuses, they lose respect and undermine
the status of discipline. Combined with the monotony of
standard training, motivation, morale and discipline are all
lessened.
E. LIVING CONDITIONS
Suvorov and Belenko both reveal that living conditions
contribute to the discipline problem by providing an
environment for theft and hazing to occur, thereby
increasing the disrespect for senior personnel and the
overall disaffection for the regime. Housing throughout the
Soviet Union is notoriously poor and military accommodations
are no exception. Communal apartments are common not only
in the civilian sector, but are the domicile as well for
most married officers. [Ref. 25: p. 79]
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Belenko also states that the Soviet armed forces do not
provide family housing for the vast majority of its
personnel. Those soldiers and sailors with families are
forced to compete in the local economy for living
arrangements. This results in cramped living conditions,
with shared kitchen and toilet facilities/ poor plumbing,
shoddy carpentry, and often inadequate protection from the
elements. [Ref. 31: pp. 97-101]
Barracks for soldiers reportedly often accommodate up to
five hundred individuals. Combined with drafty windows,
paltry heating and little or no facilities for drying wet
clothing, these barracks hardly produce a homey atmosphere.
The latrines are likely to be outside and the hot water
supply for washrooms is unreliable. Overcrowding is a way
of life for most Soviet citizens, so the fact that many
emigres recall their period of military service as
particularly confining indicates just how bad these
conditions are. [Ref. 23: pp. 34-35]
The navy may be considered even worse off. Soviet
warships have not been constructed with habitability as a
prime consideration. Many vessels do not have air
conditioning or forced ventilation. Insufficient distilling
plants do not produce adequate fresh water for personal
hygiene. Such accommodations are not conducive to the
maintenance of good order and discipline. Soviet sailors
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must frequently practice "hot-racking" to share a bunk
between two or even three sailors. Inadequate safeguards
against nuclear radiation presents a severe health hazard to
the sailors onboard nuclear powered and nuclear armed
warships. [Ref. 32: pp. 57-58]
It is rather apparent that close crowding and few
amenities lowers morale and contributes to disciplinary
problems. Petty theft and hazing also contribute to the
breakdown of discipline. Poor living conditions do not
provide a respite from the de-humanizing aspects of
Soviet military life. Discipline problems exist in part
because the servicemen do not have a safe 7 warm haven to
retire to.
F. OTHER FACTORS AND SUMMATION
Many other sources and causes of discipline violations
exist in the Soviet armed forces. The items previously
examined are noted for their frequency in a wide variety of
reports. Together they may conveniently be labeled as
quality of life items. Each factor is sufficient in itself
to explain why discipline infractions occur. The
combination of all factors not only manifests itself as
discipline problems/ but also lowers morale/ motivation and
unit cohesion. Together they generate a feeling that can
best be expressed as disaffection.
Other factors require consideration due to the potential
for increased discipline problems their existence portends.
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Notable among these factors is the growing schism between
officers and enlisted personnel. The schism promotes
disrespect and disobedience/ thereby lowering morale as well
as discipline. The officer ranks are predominately Russian,
nearly entirely Slavic, while the enlisted ranks see an
increase in minority representation. Officers have the
benefit of being able to shop in special stores and vacation
in secluded resorts, prerequisites denied to enlisted. It
is reportedly difficult for the average enlisted man even to
get his leave days authorized. Officers are normally the
recipients of better education and are more frequently able
to take advantage of family and party affiliations. [Ref.
33: pp. 369-371]
Political education and indoctrination is reported by
Suvorov as a source of dissatisfaction and disaffection
among many enlisted conscripts. They are said to resent the
large amount of time devoted to political training,
frequently accomplished at the expense of their free time.
The enlisteds are also aware that much of what they are told
about their system is blatantly false. [Ref. 22: p. 220]
Items that may be interpretted as effects of discipline
problems can also be sources of disciplinary infractions
themselves. Rumors of desertions, suicides, murders and
absenteeism may provide the impetus for someone else to
violate the rules. Drunkenness can also lead to more
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serious violations including assault/ theft/ and vandalism,
as well as desertion and absenteeism.
Of particular concern to the maintenance of discipline
is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Contact with the
Afghan populace has reportedly resulted in the increasing
use of hashish by combat troops. Wimbush and Alexiev report
that Soviet soldiers have been known to trade weapons and
other equipment for hashish and for copies of the Koran.
Incidences of atrocities committed by rebel forces against
Soviet prisoners and battle dead has apparently prompted
defections and insubordinations. As a whole/ the Afghan
invasion seems to have increased discipline problems and
resulted in lower morale. This in turn starts a new cycle
of disciplinary infractions as scared and demoralized troops
commit further violations. [Ref. 34]
The factors and sources of discipline problems in the
Soviet armed forces are to a large extent endemic to Soviet
society. Despite the clear concern for discipline by the
high command found in numerous press articles/ very little
can apparently be done to alleviate the situation without
overhauling the entire system. That is something that
cannot be done. It would require a distribution of power
and a recognition of human rights and dignities that would
be counter productive to the Soviet system.
The regime relies on punishment and the threat of
punishment to maintain discipline, as previously discussed.
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Dissent is apparently channeled away from the regime to
enemies of the state and to barrack mates, be they Stariki
or Molodye . This is not to imply that the Soviet armed
forces are ripe for open revolt. There are apparently
sufficient safeguards to prevent a military coup, such as
the KGB. Rather, it is to point out that the Soviets have
serious problems that do not appear in tables of organiza-
tion and equipment or in military power estimates. Further,
these disciplinary problems do not seem to have any validity




IV. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF DISCIPLINE
The concept of discipline in the Soviet armed forces
must be examined not only in its historical development but
also in its political context. The philosophy of the Soviet
Union/ Marxism-Leninism, acts as a state religion and
demands strict discipline. Therefore, Marxism-Leninism
must be studied in any examination of the Soviet Union, let
alone an examination of discipline in the Soviet armed
forces
.
The impact of Marxism-Leninism on the problem of
military discipline is enchanced by a consideration of the
dialectic. The dialectic purports to be a scientific
reasoning process that is based upon objective reality and
the resolution of opposites. Its appeal is in part due to
the claim that dialectic processes exist and operate
independently of human perception. Dialectical reasoning
states that any notion, or thesis, automatically implies
its own antithesis, or inherently contradictory aspects.
The resolution of the thesis and the antithesis results
in a synthesis, simultaneously a process and a result.
The synthesis in effect becomes the new thesis, is




The ape .:cation of this thought process to the problem
of military discipline allows the rationalization and
legitimization of what by Western democratic standards may
be called heinous acts, as scientifically necessary.
Indeed/ the purges of the 1930's may be justified as
historically ordained/ and explained as necessary to combat
a class enemy. Thus those acts may be considered free from
any moral repugnance/ as is also the case when psychotherapy
is used as a disciplinary technique.
Furthermore/ since the dialectic is a scientific,
evolutionary process/ there is no real failure. Every
action is therefore a progressive action. What might not be
immediately apparent when examining dialectic thought is
that it allows for the inclusion of a wide variety of
solutions to any particular problem. There is in actuality
an inordinate amount of freedom to apply radical concepts to
solve particular problems. For instance/ as when allowing
the use of psychiatric therapy for discipline problems
because the "patient" obviously does not think correctly.
The freedom to try a technique remains true as long as the
solution does not threaten the ruling regime.
More of Marxist-Leninist thought affects the concept of
discipline than just dialectics. Concepts such as quantity
evolving into quality/ the idea of the class struggle/ and
the economic nature of the development of society are
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important for a thorough understanding of the Soviet system.
However/ it is the profusion of dialectic rhetoric and the
pronouncements of dialectics as an irrefutable scientific
fact that permits the Soviet leadership to justify the
combination of legalism and what the West might consider
brutality in the maintenance of military discipline. Also/
it is dialectic thought that allows the novel solutions to
the Soviet military discipline problem/ as shown below.
Operating under the definition of military discipline as
"...the precise observance of order and rules that promotes
efficient command of troops and helps in the surmounting of
difficult combat situations/" and further of military
discipline as "...the most vital condition contributing to
the high combat capability and constant combat readiness of
the troops" [Ref. 1: p. 289]/ one would wonder what sort of
human would fulfill that definition. The solution is found
in the concept of the "new Soviet man." Such an individual
would be unselfish/ compassionate/ enlightened/ strong/
brave/ diligent/ and altruistic. "He would be unflawed by
any of the imperfections that had afflicted man in ages
past" [Ref. 25: p. 56].
The desire for the new Soviet man is in fact a desire
for predictability and orderliness. It is a desire for
automatic obedience and discipline without the need for
punishment methods. Using the logic of dialectic thought/
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the Soviets believe that they can achieve the equivalent
result of the new Soviet man by controlling the perception
of objective reality. The deliberate manipulation of
information/ including falsification, thereby prevents
certain perceptions. If the totality of information can be
controlled/ then the corresponding responses can also be
controlled. As such, the new Soviet man would perceive his
objective reality as the communist leadership wanted him to
view it. His actions would then be predictable and
orderly and there would be no discipline problems.
[Ref. 35: pp. 180-183]
In conjunction with the effort to control information as
a method to achieve a disciplined force, the Soviets have
devoted considerable resources to studying thought
processes. Recognizing that discipline problems remain even
with near total information control, Shelyag and others
identify the development of thought itself as the factor
responsible for undisciplined acts. What Shelyag terms as
"incorrect thought processes" are failures to maintain an
"integrated, scientific communist world outlook" [Ref. 36:
p. 144]. What Shelyag and the other writers actually mean
is that the individual fails to think in the required
dialectic manner and hence his behavior is incorrect.
This idea is clearly expressed when Druzhinin and
Kontorov state that military discipline will be achieved
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when trainees "unf laggingly follow the path of dialectic
logic/ and develop dialectical thought" [Ref. 35: p. 115].
This is a directive to teach soldiers to think in a
particular manner. If individual thought processes can be
mandated/ then the individual's perception and analysis of
reality will agree with the prescribed interpretation. When
such agreement of thought is present there would then be no
discipline problems. Therefore/ Druzhinin and Kontorov
state that it is extremely important for servicemen to learn
communism/ and to develop the ability to properly use
dialectics to understand reality [Ref. 35: pp. 193-194].
Such polemics may appear to be exercises in semantics
and of little importance to levels of military discipline.
It is generally agreed that mental acumen is a basic
necessity for any society to function. Methods of
instruction must therefore be standard throughout the
society/ including the military/ in order to invest the
population with societal values and standards. Yet the
Soviet Union is seeking to standardize the thought processes
of the individual in the service of the state ; and more
importantly in the service of the party/ in order to achieve
a disciplined military force. With strict discipline a
necessary requirement for orderliness/ predictability and
control of the armed forces/ the Soviets are trying to
mandate a particular style of thought itself to build a
disciplined force.
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Expressing the critical necessity for strict military
discipline in modern times/ Lomov further defines the
conditions for its attainment:
The first and most important of these conditions
is the scientific leadership of society by the
Communist Party. This is achieved by its Marxist-
Leninist conditioning/ by its ideological commitment/
by its solidarity and organization. Marxist-Leninist
conviction among all members... is the demand
underlying the foundation of unshakable discipline in
the armed forces. The meeting of these requirements
is the purpose of the 24th CPSU Congress concerning
the improvement of scientific leadership. . .and a rise
in the leading role of the party.
The second condition for further strengthening
discipline in our Soviet Armed Forces is constant
attention to the carrying out of this task in
peacetime/ as well as a correct combination of methods
of conviction and methods of coercion in the
indoctrination of the people. [Ref. 37: p. 202]
Such quotations as the above suggest that discipline
problems in the Soviet armed forces are not going to be
solved by improving living conditions or establishing
constitutional guarantees for human rights. There is no
impetus in the above statement to ameliorate the factors
previously examined as causes of disciplinary infractions.
Hence/ it may be surmised that discipline will continue to
be imposed with coersive methods of punishment and a
tendency to disregard the individual as a person.
Lomov also expresses the crucial requirement of using
scientific Marxism-Leninism to solve discipline problems in
conjunction with Soviet troop control. Stating that a
highly disciplined force is of primary necessity for troops
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to be controlled effectively/ Lomov urges the use of science
and dialectics to provide answers to fundamental problems of
discipline and control. In concert with dialectic thought/
Druzhinin and Kontorov advocate the use of the science of
control theory/ cybernetics/ to rationally solve these
problems of discipline and control.
Cybernetics/ as explained by Druzhinin and Kontorov, is
a mathematical expression of a control process. It is a
scientific examination of a controller/ an object under
control and a two-way link connecting them. Its primary
significance as a science is dependent upon the information
transmitted on the link. The information, when correctly
analyzed/ will allow the controller to direct the controlled
object in the most effective manner. Furthermore/ the
controlled object will always operate in a guaranteed,
predictable fashion. However/ as Lomov points out/ since
cybernetics is a science/ the information must be assessed
in a mathematical relationship/ or algorithm. The proper
algorithm will correctly evaluate the data and provide the
controller with the appropriate response for maximum
efficiency. [Ref. 37: pp. 165-167]
Druzhinin/ Kontorov, Lomov and others/ lead one to
believe that cybernetics is a viable concept for human as
well as machine control [Ref. 35: pp. 180-181]. But
cybernetics requires the quantification of all data for the
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algorithm to work. Clearly in military affairs some of the
most significant items are not quantifiable. Items such as
morale/ fear, hunger and disciplince escape a precise
numerical representation. Yet the Soviet insistence on
quantification for the scientific solution of disciplinary
problems manifests itself in numerical standards that
actually exacerbate the discipline problem.
The scientific solution is a series of centrally imposed
standards designed to elicit automatic responses and
unflagging discipline. By so doing/ the Soviets seem to
believe they acquire not only the predictability and
orderliness they desire/ but also that they can combine the
results in a troop control algorithm. The actual mani-
festation appears as a combination of coercive discipline
and training standards.
The imposed scientifically determined requirement for
discipline and control is the norm. The norm is an expected
behavior standard. Failure to achieve the norm is therefore
a violation of discipline. In the Soviet context/ the norm
is a statistically derived standard. But instead of being
an average/ or normal/ value/ the norm is the requirement.
With the Soviet demands for total control and strict
discipline/ there are norms for everything in military life
from the time to perform items of personal hygiene to
accuracy in weapons firing. For example/ Suvorov relates
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that tactical maneuvers are subdivided into separate/
distinct parts. Each part has specific allotments of time,
fuel and ammunition (supposedly scientifically determined)
for the successful completion of that part [Ref. 22: pp.
252-254]. Each allotment is a norm to be achieved. Norms
are not merely time standards, but include prescribed
operating procedures and definite sequential acts for such
items as how to put on a gas mask or how to do radar
plotting [Ref. 38].
This norm supposedly provides a scientific standard for
discipline. Each norm must be accomplished precisely and
exactly. Goldhamer's research reveals that failure to
achieve the norm can be punished by the imposition of extra
duties or a sentence to a discipline unit. The imposition
of scientifically derived norms is followed by an insistence
on exactingness . It is exactingness that requires that each
individual perform the norms in precise, minute detail
[Ref. 30: p. 142]. Each individual will supposedly
understand the requirement for attention to detail through
dialectic reasoning. That is, according to Byely, each
serviceman, properly trained to think in dialectical
logic will of course completely agree with the necessity
to fulfill the norm as a scientific absolute [Ref. 39:
pp. 233-234].
Yet this Soviet attempt to solve disciplinary problems
through science is what Suvorov and others identify as being
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responsible for the monotonous and repetitious training
examined earlier. It is this type of boring training that
breeds disaffection and disrespect and lowers the discipline
of soldiers and sailors. Furthermore/ Lomov and others
state that norms are to be established from observed and
measured activities. Yet, if Goldhamer's research
concerning the deliberate falsification of reports on
everything from fuel consumption to equipment capabilities
is correct/ then the norms become arbitrarily imposed
standards. Furthermore/ Goldhamer states that norms become
attained or surpassed by further falsification [Ref. 30:
p. 150].
The falsification of results undermines the entire
discipline and control apparatus/ if the data are manu-
factured/ then the decision/ control and discipline
solutions have no basis in reality. Consequently/ the
scientific solution for discipline demanded by the political
philosophy is also faulty. Clearly the solution only
increases the problem/ and highlights the paradox of trying
to quantify non-quantifiable elements.
In summary/ the political philosophy of Marxism-Leninism
demands a scientific solution for the Soviet military
discipline problem. However/ the factors that cause
discipline problems can not be quantified to fit neatly into
some prescribed control algorithm. Dialectic thought is
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supposed to provide the method whereby diverse solutions
,
from the imposition of the norm to imprisonment/ are
combined to provide actual solutions for the Soviet military
discipline problem. Yet what appears to in fact occur is a
continuation of the historical preference for physical
punishments as the method of imposing discipline on the
armed forces. Hence/ there is a return to the first paradox




V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The examination of discipline in the Soviet armed forces
reveals two paradoxes that would seem to impede the
attainment of a disciplined/ controlled force. First of
all/ the historical development of the concept of discipline
appears to reveal a consistent pattern by Russian and Soviet
leaders to rely on methods of physical punishment as the
primary means of imposing discipline. The paradox arises
when the methods of attaining discipline are compared with
contemporaneous regulations/ constitutional clauses and
ostensibly humanitarian/ socialist philosophies. The
paradox becomes more pronounced when the habit/ or custom/
of using physical punishment to impose discipline is
compared to the example of Alexander Suvorov. Suvorov
established and maintained discipline through the use of
non-punitive measures and achieved striking battlefield
successes
.
The second paradox appears to be the result of the
Soviet insistence for a scientific solution to the
discipline problem in the armed forces. Marxist-Leninist
analysis of the nature of man and modern war/ conducted
through the logic of the dialectic, seems to provide an
objective answer to the question of how to solve the
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discipline problem. However, the solution proposed through
the science of cybernetics requires the quantification of
discipline to insert into a control algorithm. Yet this is
in contrast to the seemingly universal recognition of
discipline as a non-quantifiable morale factor of war. It
appears from a review of current disciplinary problems in
the Soviet armed forces that punishment is still the primary
method of imposing discipline because the application of
science has failed. It seems rather apparent that the "new
Soviet man" does not yet exist.
The examination of military discipline seems to reveal
potentially severe restrictions on Soviet combat capability
that are not apparent in quantitative analysis. The
emphasis on strict discipline and control/ with requirements
for exactingness and prescribed responses would seem to
reduce the capability for individual creativity during
combat operations. It brings into question the ability of
such a force to conduct sustained offensive operations when
the fog and friction of war preclude the infusion of
necessary data for control algorithms. There is then the
implication that the Soviets will not be able to effectively
control their forces.
It would seem that the apparent lack of control and
discipline would be of increasing significance if the
Soviets intend to adopt a military strategy involving
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conventional conflic in preference to a spasm nuclear war.
This is because history has repeatedly demonstrated/ as
Clausewitz pointed out/ that the morale factors are of
supreme importance in war. Morale factors/ such as
discipline/ can overcome quantitative deficiencies that are
easily measured. Conversely/ a deficiency in morale levels/
like discipline/ can reduce the military power that is
revealed in quantitative assessments like orders of battle
and tables of organization and equipment.
It would appear/ then ; that the conventional military
power of tne Soviet Union is less than that revealed through
a tabulation of men and equipments. However/ an exact
determination is not possible since discipline is only one
of several non-quantifiable morale factors in modern war.
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